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This study investigates the impact of liquidity crises on the relationship between stock (value 
and size) premiums and default risk in the US market. It first examines whether financial 
distress can explain value and size premiums, and then, subsequently, aims to determine 
whether liquidity crises increase the risk of value and size premium investment strategies. 
The study employs a time-varying approach and a sample of US stock returns for the period 
between January 1982 and March 2011, a period which includes the current liquidity crisis, 
so as to examine the relationship between default risk, liquidity crises and value and size 
premiums. The findings indicate that the default premium has explanatory power for value 
and size and premiums, which affect firms with different characteristics. We also find that 
liquidity crises may actually increase the risks related to size and value premium strategies. 
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DO FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND LIQUIDITY CRISES AFFECT 
VALUE AND SIZE PREMIUMS? 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the impact of liquidity crises on the relationship between stock (value 
and size) premiums and default risk in the US market. It first examines whether financial 
distress can explain value and size premiums, and then, subsequently, aims to determine 
whether liquidity crises increase the risk of value and size premium investment strategies. 
The study employs a time-varying approach and a sample of US stock returns for the period 
between January 1982 and March 2011, a period which includes the current liquidity crisis, 
so as to examine the relationship between default risk, liquidity crises and value and size 
premiums. The findings indicate that the default premium has explanatory power for value 
and size and premiums, which affect firms with different characteristics. We also find that 
liquidity crises may actually increase the risks related to size and value premium strategies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Fama and French (1992, 1998) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), among others, 
identify a value premium in U.S. stocks, hence value stocks are found to have higher average 
returns than growth stocks.1 Fama and French (1992) further highlight the existence of a size 
premium where small stocks tend to outperform big stocks.2 These phenomena led to the 
development of the value and size premium investment strategies, where the value premium 
strategy involves buying value stocks and selling growth stocks, while the size premium 
strategy entails buying small stocks and selling big stocks. This study examines some of the 
determinants of these premiums in that 1) it analyses the link between financial distress and 
value and size premiums; 2) it systematically analyses the link between liquidity crises and 
value and size premiums; 3) it investigates the volatility of size and value premiums during 
financial crises, with the aim of determining whether there is a risk explanation for these 
premiums; and 4) it compares the results for two different measures of financial distress (i.e. 
default premiums and credit spreads) to determine whether the choice of measure could have 
an impact on the determination of the link between liquidity crises and value and size 
premiums. In particular, this study contributes to the literature in that it is the first, to the best 
of our knowledge, to explicitly examine the relationship between default risk, liquidity crises 
and stock premiums. 
This study is particularly relevant, given the recent financial crisis and corresponding 
increase in the risk of corporate default, in that there is mixed evidence in the literature 
regarding the link between default risk and the value and size premiums. Elgammal and 
McMillan (2014), Garlappi and Yan (2011), Griffin and Lemmon (2002), Vassalou and Xing 
(2004), Ivaschenko (2003) and Penman, Richardson and Tuna (2007) all suggest that the 
value premium increases with the level of default risk. This argument is supported by Fama 
and French (1996, 1998) and Black (2006) in that they argue that investors require a higher 
return on value stocks compared to growth stocks as a compensation for their higher 
vulnerability as a result of financial distress. Moreover, Elgammal and Al-Najjar (2014) 
report a leverage effect in the value premium indices. This being said the link between default 
risk and returns in stocks with different book-to-market levels is far from certain. For 
example, Piotroski (2000) finds that, within high book-to-market stocks, those with lower 
                                                 
1 Value stocks are defined as stocks that have high book-to-market ratios, as opposed to growth stocks which are 
defined as stocks that have low book-to-market ratios. 
2 Small stocks are defined as stocks with a low market capitalisation while big stocks are stocks with a high 
market capitalisation. 
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financial health earn lower returns, while Mohanram (2005) points out that, within low book-
to-market stocks, those with weaker growth attributes earn lower returns. More recently, 
Huang, Yang, & Zhang, (2013) argue that the value and size premiums do not appear to be 
driven by financial distress risk in the Chinese stock market. One should note, however, that 
none of these studies examines the impact that liquidity3 crises have on stock premiums. 
This omission of liquidity crises from previous studies may be crucial in that one would 
expect there to be an increasing amount of financial distress in firms during these periods. 
Indeed, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) suggests that the 2007 liquidity crisis shows 
that safe debts issued by financial innovations in the U.S market were, in fact, unsafe and as 
risky as equity. When these debt-holders recognized the extent to which they had 
underestimated this risk, they consequently modified their portfolios by selling equity and 
buying risk free debts. They further propose that this modification reduces interest rates, 
raises both leverage and risk premiums, and finally increases the vulnerability of the financial 
sector to shocks. In conjunction with this, in an earlier study Hahn and Lee (2006) conclude 
that size and value premiums are compensation for higher exposure to the risks related to 
changing credit market conditions and interest rates. This fact, together with the previous 
literature discussed above, which links financial distress and stock premiums, lends credence 
to our argument of a relation *between liquidity crises, default risk and stock premiums. This 
link is currently particularly relevant given the fact that, since the summer of 2007, the U.S. 
has experienced a striking contraction in wealth, an increase in risk spreads, and a 
deterioration in credit market functioning, all of which have affected stock markets 
significantly (for details, see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and 
Tehranian, 2011; Dick-Nielsen, Feldhűtter and Lando, 2012; and Cukierman, 2013). 
On a slightly separate note, although there is a great deal of interest in stock market 
volatility, there has been little analysis of the impact of volatility on stock premiums. This 
study therefore further contributes to the literature in that it is one of the first to link a time-
varying analysis of volatility with default risk, liquidity crises and firm characteristics (value, 
growth, large and small firms) using a monthly data frequency. Furthermore, Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) argue that the previous researchers’ results for the returns of 
financially distressed stocks depend on the particular measure of financial distress used. This 
study therefore makes an additional contribution to the literature by comparing the results for 
two different proxies for financial distress, i.e. the default premium and credit spread. 
                                                 
3 Although the term ‘liquidity’ has many different meanings in finance, we define liquidity as funding liquidity. 
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By way of preview, we can summarise the findings of this study into three main 
conclusions. 1) The default premium is found to have a significant and positive impact on 
both value and size premiums. 2) When compared to the entire sample period (January 1982 
to March 2011), the value premium of large firms during the last expansion phase (November 
2001 to July 2007) is found to be higher. 3) Leverage effects are found to have a significant 
impact on the volatility of both value and size premiums. 4) Our analysis suggests that 
liquidity crises have explanatory power when examining the volatility of large stocks’ value 
premium and size premiums, regardless of whether one controls for the default premium. 
This result may be of concern for many investors as it indicates that a liquidity crisis may 
increase the risk related to size and value investment strategies. These results also support the 
risk explanation for size and value premiums as gives a rational explanation for the higher 
returns on these strategies in that these returns obtained by investors would merely be 
compensation for the higher risk incurred. 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the properties 
of the sample data. Section 3 outlines the methodology employed in the study. Section 4 
presents the empirical findings and Section 5 concludes. 
2. DESCRIPTION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DATA 
This study examines the impact of default premiums and liquidity crises on stock premiums 
for U.S. stocks using Fama-French portfolios and benchmark factors, i.e. value and size 
premiums. The data for these portfolios and benchmarks was collected from DataStream for 
the period between January 1982 and March 2011. The data consists of the intersections of 
two portfolios based on size, i.e. the respective market capitalisation, and three portfolios 
based on value, i.e. the respective book-to-market ratios. 
The respective size breakpoint for each time interval, i.e. year ݐ, is the median New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) market equity at the end of June of year ݐ. The book-to-
market ratios are based on the book equity for the last fiscal year-end in year ݐ െ 1 divided by 
the market equity for December of year ݐ െ 1. Following this, breakpoints were calculated as 
the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. The intersections of these factors yield six portfolios, i.e. 
Small Value, Small Neutral, Small Growth, Big Value, Big Neutral and Big Growth. The 
portfolios for July of year ݐ to June of year ݐ ൅ 1 include all stocks listed on the NYSE, 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NASDAQ, for which market equity data for 
December of year ݐ െ 1 and June of year ݐ and (positive) book equity data was available. 
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Having formed the portfolios, we then obtained the Fama-French factors for the size 
and value factor from Kenneth French’s website4. The first of these, i.e. the size factor 
ሺܵܯܤሻ, is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the 
three big portfolios. The second factor, i.e. the value factor ሺܪܯܮሻ, is the average return on 
the two value portfolios minus the average returns on the two growth portfolios. Following 
this, sub-factors were calculated, as these were not available on the website at the time, to 
calculate the cross-effects of factors. The large stocks value premium ሺܮܸܲሻ is the average 
return on big value portfolios minus the average return on big growth portfolios. In a similar 
manner, the small stocks provide the source of the small stocks value premium ሺܸܵܲሻ. The 
value stocks size premium ሺܸܵܲሻ is the average return on the small value portfolio minus the 
average return on big value portfolios. Finally, the growth stocks size premium ሺܩܵܲሻ is the 
difference between the small growth portfolio and the big growth portfolio. The 
characteristics of the value and size premiums are displayed in Figures I and II, respectively. 
[INSERT FIGURES I AND II ABOUT HERE] 
As Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) highlight that returns on financially 
distressed stocks would depend on the particular measure of financial distress used; this study 
uses two different proxies for financial distress, i.e. the default premium and the credit 
spread. The default premium is defined as the difference between the interest paid by firms 
and the default free rate of interest, where this spread is proportional to their default 
probability as compensation to lenders for increased default risk. The default premium was 
collected from the Morgan Stanley International (MSCI) database provided by Ibbotson 
Associates, where the default premium index represents the difference between returns on 
long-term corporate bonds and long-term government bonds. Following this, we define the 
credit spread as the difference between the Moody BAA index and AAA index as reported by 
Bloomberg. Using these two different proxies for the default risk premium is further 
motivated by the conceptual difference between using a credit spread level and a return. In 
this regard, a credit spread level is a proxy for valuation; while the change in the credit spread 
is much more closely related to an excess return on a portfolio of corporate bonds (for more 
detail see Hull, Prudescu and White, 2004; and Huang and Huang, 2003). 
                                                 
4 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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The current study also uses the yields derived from the 3-month TED spread5 as a 
proxy for a liquidity crisis. The TED spread is a good proxy for fluctuations in liquidity 
levels and credit risk in that it reflect the perceived risk in the global financial system. As this 
widens, investors believe that credit risk, and consequently default risk, increases, thereby 
leading them to withdraw liquidity, and vice versa. For instance, during the latest financial 
crisis, the               3-month TED spread jumped from 150 to 300 basis points. (For more 
detail on the relation TED spreads and financial crises, see Akay, Senyuz and Yoldas, 2013; 
Boyson, Stahel and Stulz, 2010; Schwarz, 2015; Nagel, 2012; Marcini, Ranaldo, 
Wrampelmeyer, 2013.) The characteristics of the proxy variables, i.e. the default premium, 
credit spread and 3-month TED spread are displayed in Figure III. 
[INSERT FIGURE III ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, the study also includes the most recent expansionary economic cycle, 
corresponding to the period between November 2001 and July 2007, as a dummy variable in 
the analysis. This is included in the study as, given that one of the factors being examined is 
the impact of the default premium on stock returns and that this cycle covers the period 
immediately preceding the most recent liquidity crisis, including this period as a variable may 
provide further understanding of the factors and reasons behind the crisis. 
[INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE] 
Having defined the variables above, Table I presents the descriptive statistics for the six 
different size and value premiums described above.6 Given that the sample comprised 
monthly size and value premiums from January 1982 to March 2011, we landed up with 351 
observations, where average premiums ranged from -0.0779% for the growth size premium to 
0.493% for the small value premium, with standard deviations ranging from 2.9737% for the 
size premium to 4.2631% for the small value premium. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, results from the Ljung-Box Q-statistics (Ljung and Box, 1978) and ARCH-LM 
tests (Engle, 1982) indicate that the some of the value premiums demonstrate significant 
serial correlation and that all six premiums are found to demonstrate strong evidence of 
ARCH effects indicating the importance of incorporating time-varying characteristics when 
examining their volatility. 
                                                 
5 The 3-month TED spread is defined as the difference between the yields on 3-month T-Bills and 3-month 
Eurodollar futures contracts with the same identical expiration months. 
6 All variables have been tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 
1981). Results indicate that all series are first difference stationary but, for reasons of brevity, are not presented 
here but are available upon request. 
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Having described the data employed in this study above, the following section outlines 
the various methodology used in this study to identify whether there is a significant link 
between default premiums, liquidity crises and stock premiums. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This study employs different specifications of the Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and Generalised ARCH (GARCH) models (Engle, 1982; 
Bollerslev, 1987) to investigate the impact of liquidity crises on the relationship between the 
time-varying volatility of stock premiums, default risk and liquidity crises. In doing this, this 
study is one of the first to link a time-varying analysis of volatility with default risk, liquidity 
crises and firm characteristics (value, growth, large and small firms) using monthly data. This 
methodology allows for the investigation of the relationships between the mean value and 
volatility of variables over the sample period. This may help us to examine if risks related 
with a liquidity crisis and both value and default move in tandem, given the impact of the 
recent liquidity crisis. 
The motivation behind using this technique is three-fold. 1) It allows us to investigate 
the relationship between variables in addition to their actual volatility as measured by their 
conditional variance. The applied model should help in providing a more precise definition of 
the potential sources of macroeconomic aggregate non-diversifiable risk. 2) Although there is 
a great deal of interest in stock market volatility, there has been less analysis on stock 
premiums volatility. The work in this study, therefore, is one of the first to link this 
framework of analysis with default risk using firm characteristics (value, growth, large and 
small firms) and monthly data. 3) The time-varying volatility methodology allows us to 
examine the impact of leverage on stock premiums, thereby incorporating both default 
measures of risk and leverage, highlighting the link between the stock premiums and 
financial distress. 
Following the approached outlined by Darrat, et al. (2011) and Glosten, Jaganathan and 
Runkle (1993), this study uses different specifications of the ܩܣܴܥܪሺ1,1ሻ model7  to 
investigate the relationship between default risk, liquidity crises and value and size 
premiums.  
                                                 
7 The research uses different versions of the GARCH model, including one or more of the following: the 
standard deviation, leverage effects, the first lag of the value premium, and seasonal effects. The authors also 
employed different versions of the ordinary least squares approach; however, as results do not significantly 
differ, and for reasons of brevity, all other results not presented here but are available upon request. 
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3.1 Default and Stock Premiums 
In order to shed light on the relationship between financial distress and stock premiums, the 
standard ܩܣܴܥܪሺ1,1ሻ model is modified to include the default premium (alternately credit 
spread) in the mean equation as shown in Expression (1). We also add a dummy as well as 
the first-lag of the stock premiums to the mean equation so as to examine whether seasonal 
effects have any impact on stock premiums and whether there is any autocorrelation in 
premiums, respectively. Hence our model is now expressed as: 
ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߶ଵܦܧܨܣܷܮ ௧ܶ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ             (1) 
݄௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߚ݄௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߥ௧ 
In the mean equation of Expression (1), ܸܵܲݏ denotes each of the six different size 
premiums, defined in Section 2, at time ݐ, respectively. These include the value premium 
ሺܪܯܮሻ, the large value premium ሺܮܸܲሻ, the small value premium ሺܸܵܲሻ, the size premium 
ሺܵܯܤሻ, the growth size premium ሺܩܵܲሻ and the value size premium ሺܸܵܲሻ. The first lag of 
ܸܵܲݏ ሺܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵሻ denotes the respective stock premium at time ݐ െ 1, and ܦܧܨܣܷܮܶ denotes 
the default risk premium (or alternately the credit spread), defined in Section 2, at time ݐ. 
ܦܷܯܯܻ denotes the dummy variable for the expansionary period, defined in Section 2, at 
time ݐ, where ܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൌ 1 if the observation falls during the period between November 
2001 and July 2007 and ܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൌ 0 otherwise. Finally, ܵܧܣܱܵܰ denotes the dummy 
variable for the January effect, where ܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൌ 1 if the current month is January and 
ܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൌ 0 otherwise. In the variance equation, ߱ denotes the impact of the long-run 
average variance on the volatility at time ݐ, ߙ measures the effect of a volatility shock at time 
ݐ െ 1 on the volatility at time ݐ, and ߚ measures the impact of past shocks on the volatility at 
time ݐ, while ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻ ൑ 1 measures the persistence of volatility shocks in the model. 
In order to check the robustness of the results, we also test for the presence of ARCH 
effects in the data both before and after we estimated the models using the ARCH-LM test. 
Should the residuals be non-conditionally normal distributed, we calculate the quasi-
maximum likelihood (QML) covariances and standard errors using the outlined in Bollerslev 
and Wooldridge (1992) for heteroskedastic consistent covariance. This study also tests for 
presence of serial correlation in the variables using the Ljung-Box Q-statistics, correcting for 
any serial correlation using the Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) approach. 
3.2 Liquidity Crises and Stock Premiums 
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Having outlined how this study will examine the relationship between financial distress and 
stock premiums, we now employ a Threshold ARCH (TARCH) model (Rabemananjara and 
Zakoian, 1993) to examine the relationship between liquidity crises and stock premiums. This 
method is employed because good news and bad news may have different impacts on volatility 
(Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner, 1992; Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle, 1993; Black, 2002), 
therefore this model enables us to allow for and measure these asymmetric shocks to volatility. It 
is crucial to understand this complex relationship between liquidity crises and stock premiums if 
investors and fund managers are to build an investment strategy during these liquidity crises. This 
model is therefore expressed as follows: 
ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߣ݄௧ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߯ଵܶܧܦ௧ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ             (2) 
݄௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛߝ௧ିଵଶ ݀௧ ൅ ߚ݄௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߯ଶܶܧܦ௧൅ߥ௧ 
In the mean equation in Expression (2)	ܸܵܲݏ, ܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ, ܵܧܣܱܵܰ and ܦܷܯܯܻ remain as in 
Expression (1), while ݄ denotes the standard deviation of the respective stock premium, 
which is included in order to determine whether stock premiums in the U.S. follow time-
varying phenomena. Finally,  ܶܧܦ denotes the change in the 3-month TED spread, which 
acts as a proxy for liquidity crises. In the variance equation, ߱, and ߚ remain as in Expression 
(1), while ݀௧ denotes a dummy variable where ݀௧ ൌ 1 if ߝ௧ ൏ 0 and ݀௧ ൌ 0 otherwise. This 
would imply that there are differential effects in the conditional variance where ߝ௧ ൏ 0, i.e. an 
unexpected decrease in the stock premium, denotes bad news, while ߝ௧ ൐ 0, i.e. an 
unexpected increase in the stock premium denotes good news. In Expression (2), ߙ measures 
the impact of good news, ߙ ൅ ߛ measures the impact of bad news, ߛ measures the leverage 
effect and ሺߙ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ 2⁄ ሻ ൑ 1 measures the persistence of volatility. One should note that the 
leverage effect indicates that a decrease in stock prices leads to an increase in financial leverage 
as the value of equity falls relative to corporate debt; hence both the required return on equity and 
risk increase (Christie, 1982; Black, 2002). Finally, ߯ଶ measures the impact of changes in the 3-
month TED spread on the volatility of the stock premiums. 
 
 
3.3 Controlling for Default Risk 
The final model examined here is an extension of Expression (2) in that it includes the default 
premium. This extra parameter is included to allow us to measure the impact that leverage has on 
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the relationship between the size premium and liquidity measured in Expression (2). This new 
model is therefore expressed as follows: 
ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߣ݄௧ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߶ଵܦܧܨܣܷܮܶ ൅ ߯ଵܶܧܦ௧ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ
൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ             (3) 
݄௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛߝ௧ିଵଶ ݀௧ ൅ ߚ݄௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߶ଶܦܧܨܣܷܮܶ ൅ ߯ଶܶܧܦ௧൅ߥ௧ 
In the mean equation of Expression (3), ܸܵܲݏ, ܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ, ܦܧܨܣܷܮܶ, ܵܧܣܱܵܰ and ܦܷܯܯܻ 
remain as in Expression (1), while ݄ and ܶܧܦ remain as in Expression (2). In the variance 
equation, ߱, ߙ, ߚ, ߛ and ݀ as well as ߯ଶ and ሺߙ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ 2⁄ ሻ ൑ 1 remain as in Expression (2), 
while ߶ଶ measures the impact of the default premium (or alternately the credit spread) on the 
volatility of the stock premiums 
Having outlined the methodologies employed in this study above, the following section 
examines the empirical results for this models and the respective implications thereof. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Default and Stock Premiums 
We begin our analysis of the empirical results by examining the relationship between 
financial distress (proxied by the default premium) and the stock premiums using the model 
outlined in Expression (1). Since the default premium is the difference between returns on 
long-term corporate and government bonds, this premium reflects compensation for the 
additional risk associated with corporate bonds, and therefore may be positively associated 
with leverage, or at least capture some of the characteristics of this leverage. This argument is 
supported by Ivaschenko (2003) and Molina (2005) who both report a positive and significant 
link between the level of corporate leverage and default risk. This study extends this 
argument by examining this relation within the context of value and size premiums, where 
the results of this analysis are presented in Table II. 
[INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE] 
These findings support the argument above in that they suggest that there is strong 
evidence of a positive and significant relation between the default premium and both value 
and size premiums. These results are consistent with the notion that value stocks are more 
vulnerable to default risk than growth stocks, given the fact that they higher levels of 
leverage; hence, stockholders would require higher returns for value stocks than for growth 
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stocks in the case of an increase in the probability of default. In addition to this, our results 
further support the idea that small firms are riskier than large firms during an economic 
downturn, given that investment in small firms requires a higher rate of return. We also find 
that the first-lag of the stock premium has a significant and positive impact on current 
premiums for three of the six stock premiums, thereby suggesting that these may have some 
forecasting power. The value stock size premium is also found to display a January effect, 
while our findings further suggest that value and large stock value premiums are higher 
during the most recent expansionary economic cycle. 
These arguments are consistent with earlier literature in that Fama and French (1996) 
and Chan and Chen (1991) link value and size premiums with financial risks stating that 
value and small stocks tend to experience poorer performance, earnings and profitability 
when compared to growth and big stocks. All these factors make value and small stocks more 
vulnerable to the risk of default and lead investors to ask for higher returns on value stocks as the 
leverage increases. Additionally, Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Black (2006) suggest that book-
to-market and size effects are concentrated within firms with a high risk of default, which is 
supported by this study’s finding of a positive relationship between the default and value 
premiums. In other words, our findings further support the risk-explanation for the value 
premium proposed by Fama and French (1996) who imply that the value premium acts as a form 
of compensation for a non-diversifiable risk factor. 
As robustness check, and given that Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) argue that 
using different proxies for default risk produces different results; we re-estimated the model 
using the credit spread as a substitute for the default premium.8 Results suggest that although 
there is still a positive relation between default risk and the size premium, there does not 
appear to be a significant relation between credit spreads and the value premium. This result 
therefore lends further credence to Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi’s (2008) proposition that 
using different proxies for default risk produces different results. 
 
4.2 Liquidity Crises and Stock Premiums 
Having identified a positive a significant relation between the default premium and stock 
premiums as well as a significant leverage effect in stock premium volatility, we now 
                                                 
8 For reasons of brevity, these results are not presented here but are available from the author upon request 
(alternatively are presented in the appendix in Table A1). 
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examine the impact of liquidity crises (proxied by the 3-month TED spread) on stock returns 
using the model outlined in Expression (2). This argument is based on the proposition that 
value and size premiums are proxies for systematic risk (Fama and French, 1992; 1998; 
2006), hence one expects there to be a relation between these and liquidity crises. This is 
crucial in that understanding the sophisticated relation between liquidity crises and stock 
premiums is important in order for investors and fund managers to build an investment 
strategy during this crisis period, where the results of this analysis are presented in Table III. 
[INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE] 
These results indicate that although liquidity crises might not have a significant effect 
on any of the stock premiums themselves, these crises definitely do have an effect on the 
volatility of some of the stock premiums, namely the large stock value premium and the size 
and value stock size premiums. This is apparent in that the 3-month TED spread is found to 
have significant predictive power with respect to the volatility of these stock premiums. The 
observed negative relation implies that an increase in the probability of a liquidity crisis 
results in a decrease in the risk related to these premiums. This result is consistent with 
Huang, Yang, and Zhang (2013), who argue that value and size premiums do not appear to be 
driven by financial distress risk. Interestingly, these results, at least partially, fail to support 
the systematic risk explanation for the value and size premiums and thereby keep the ongoing 
debate active. 
We also find evidence of a significant January effect for some size premiums, a 
significant relation during the most recent expansionary economic cycle and significant 
leverage effect on the volatility of all value and some size premiums, while the lags of some 
stock premiums are found to have significant forecasting power. Finally, there is a greater 
level of leverage effect associated with almost all stock premium strategies and the volatility 
of said premiums during the most recent expansionary economic cycle. These findings lends 
at least partial credence to the leverage hypothesis proposed by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 
(1997) in that this suggests the degree of leverage in a firm may be a key factor in explaining 
the volatility of returns, especially during a period of recession. 
 
 
4.3 Controlling for Default Risk 
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Having identified significant relations between default premiums, leverage effects and 
liquidity crises and stock premiums, we conclude our analysis of stock premiums by 
examining the impact of liquidity crises on stock premiums after controlling for default risk 
using the model outlined in Expression (3), thereby determining the joint impact of these 
factors. As discussed above, the rationale for the inclusion the default premium is that, since 
the default premium is the differential between returns on long-term corporate and 
government bonds, this premium reflects compensation for the additional risk associated with 
corporate bonds, and therefore may be positively associated with leverage, or at least capture 
some of the characteristics of this leverage (Ivaschenko, 2003; Molina, 2005). Continuing 
this, liquidity crises are included, in turn, since value and size premiums are argued to be 
proxies for systematic risk (Fama and French, 1992; 1998; 2006), hence one expect there to 
be a relation between these and liquidity crises. The results of this analysis of the joint impact 
of the default premium and liquidity crises on stock premiums are presented in Table IV. 
These findings suggest that the default premium has a significant and positive impact 
on both value and size premiums themselves, while it has no explanatory power for the 
volatility of these stock premiums. This is in almost direct contrast with liquidity crises in 
that these have a significant and negative impact on the volatility of all size premiums and the 
large value premium. We also find that there is a significant January effect in the size and 
growth stock size premiums; that the most recent expansionary economic cycle has a 
significant relation with all value premiums; and that the lag of the value, small stock value 
and growth stock size premiums have significant forecasting power. Finally, we find that 
there is a significant leverage effect for all value premiums. 
A possible explanation for the positive and significant relation between the default 
premium and value and size premiums could be that an increase in financial leverage, proxied 
by the default premium, increases the risk associated with an investment in value stocks as 
these tend to be more levered than other firms, while the increase in the risk associated with 
an investment in small stocks may be as a result of the fact that these are more vulnerable to 
financial distress. This view is supported by Leledakis, Davidson and Smith (2008) who 
attribute the size effect to small and highly leveraged firms. In total, this result indicates that 
investors require higher returns on value stocks and small stocks when default risk increases.  
In terms of the impact of liquidity crises, this may be explained by the fact an increase 
in the probability of a liquidity crisis may limit access to funds for leverage, thereby 
increasing the risk of financial distress, which, in turn may cause fluctuations in the returns 
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on these stocks. This may be especially apparent for small value stocks given that these are 
more vulnerable to liquidity risk, as the collapse of the credit channel during a financial crisis 
period has a more severe effect on them as they do not have similar access to the other credit 
alternatives available to larger firms (Gisecke, Longstaff, Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2014; 
Bernanke, 1983).  
These findings are consistent with those obtained by Bali and Engle (2010) who use the 
default premium, changes in the Federal Reserve effective interest rate and the term premium 
as the macroeconomic controlling variables in a regression model used to study the risk-return 
trade-off in the Intertemporal Capital Assets Pricing Model (ICAPM) framework. In their study, 
they found a significant and negative relationship between the changes in the Federal Reserve 
interest rate and expected stock returns in the short-run period. This negative relationship 
commonly occurs in the U.S. stock market after the Federal Reserve’s unexpected increase or 
decrease in interest rates. They also document that changes in default spreads do not affect 
variations in daily stock returns. Although, this current study uses a lower data frequency than 
previous studies, it still reports a significant relation between default risk, liquidity crises and 
stock premiums. 
As a robustness check, and given that Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) argue 
that using different proxies for default risk produces different results; we re-estimated the 
model using the credit spread as a substitute for the default premium.9 Results suggest that 
although there is still a positive relation between default risk and the size premium, there does 
not appear to be a significant relation between credit spreads and the value premium. This 
result therefore lends further credence to Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi’s (2008) 
proposition that using different proxies for default risk produces different results. 
4.4 Which Model Best Explains Stock Premiums? 
The final step in our analysis of the relation between stock premiums, default premiums, 
leverage effects and liquidity crises is to determine which of the three models proposed in 
Expressions (1), (2) and (3) best explain stock premiums. In order to do this, we performed a 
likelihood-ratio test on those models that are nested, the results of which are presented in    
Table V. 
Test findings suggest that when examining the nested model of the relation between the 
default premium and stock premiums, he unrestricted version in Expression (3) is preferred to 
                                                 
9 For reasons of brevity, these results are not presented here but are available from the author upon request 
(alternatively are presented in the appendix in Table A2). 
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the restricted version in Expression (1) for all but the growth stock size premium. The results 
from the test further suggest that when examining the nested model of the relation between 
liquidity crises and stock premiums, the unrestricted version in Expression (3) is preferred to 
the restricted version in Expression (2). Given that the version of the two nested models in 
Expression (3) is preferred to all other versions of these models for most stock premiums, we 
can thus conclude that stock premiums are best explained when both the default premium and 
the 3-month TED spread are incorporated in the model. We therefore infer from the results 
presented in this paper that stock premiums are best explained when the impact of liquidity 
crises and financial distress on these is jointly determined. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This study examines some of the determinants of value and size premiums in that 1) it 
analyses the link between financial distress and value and size premiums; 2) it systematically 
analyses the link between liquidity crises (particularly the 2007-2008 financial crisis) and 
value and size premiums; 3) it measures the impact that volatility has on size and value 
premiums, with the aim of determining whether there is a risk explanation for these; and 4) it 
compares the results for two different measures of financial distress (i.e. default premiums 
and credit spreads) to determine whether the choice of measure could have an impact on the 
determination of the link between liquidity crises and value and size premiums. In particular, 
this study contributes to the literature in that it is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to 
explicitly examine the relationship between default risk, liquidity crises and stock premiums. 
By way of summary, we can divide our results into the following main sets of findings. 
1) The default premium is found to have a significant and positive impact on both value and 
size premiums. 2) When compared to the entire sample period (January 1982 to March 2011), 
the value premium of large firms during the last expansion phase (November 2001 to July 
2007) is found to be higher. 3) Leverage effects are found to have a significant impact on the 
volatility of both value and size premiums. 4) Our analysis suggests that liquidity crises have 
explanatory power when examining the volatility of large stocks’ value premium and size 
premiums, regardless of whether one controls for the default premium. This result may be of 
concern for many investors as it indicates that a liquidity crisis may affect the risk related to 
size and value investment strategies. 
These findings therefore suggest that the default premium has explanatory power for 
the value and growth stock premiums. Since this explanatory power affects firms with 
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different characteristics, it provides further evidence in favour of the argument that default 
premiums capture systematic risk in the macro-economy and that value and growth premiums 
are associated with a rational decision-making on the part of investors. This is based on the 
proposition that value and size premiums act as a proxy for systematic risk (Fama and 
French, 1996; Chan and Chen, 1991). The positive association between the default premium 
and value and size premiums in addition to the strong evidence of a leverage effect on the 
volatility of these premiums thereby lend support to the risk-based explanation for the source 
of value and size premiums. This would therefore imply that value and size stocks that are 
characterised by poor performance, earnings and profitability when compared to growth 
stocks are more vulnerable to the risk of default, which, in turn would lead investors to 
require a higher return on value stocks as leverage increases. Interestingly, when re-
estimating the respective models using credit spreads, rather than default premiums, given 
that Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) argue that using different proxies for default risk 
produces different results, we found that these only have a significant relation with size 
premiums, thereby lending support to Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi’s (2008) proposition. 
This paper is also one of the first to explore the impact of liquidity crises on variables 
that are now central to assets pricing models, i.e. the value and size premiums. The regression 
findings indicate that the liquidity crises have a negative association with the risk related to 
some value and all size premiums. One possible explanation for this is that the returns on 
value and size investment strategies may be less volatile in the liquidity crises period. This 
result is contrast with our initial hypothesis that the lack of funds may increase the risk 
associated with value stocks more than that of growth stocks, and result in a larger increase in 
the risk of small stocks than large stocks. This result open the door for further research to 
investigate reason behind this issue. 
In conclusion, the empirical work in this paper suggests some possible answers for the 
initial questions about the role of financial distress and liquidity crises as macroeconomic risk 
factors that can explain the source of the value and size premiums. The empirical findings 
contribute to the existing knowledge by providing additional evidence of the positive 
association between financial distress and stock premiums. The results suggest that value and 
size premiums are working as proxy for non-diversifiable factors related to financial distress. 
Finally, using a different methodology, and a longer data set, our results appear to support the 
proposition that that value and size premiums appear to be pervasive and work as state 
variables that are proxies for financial distress (Fama and French, 1996; 2006; 2007). 
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TABLE I: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
This table presents the summary statistics for the sample of stock premiums as well as respective the Ljung-Box 
test for serial correlation (Ljung and Box, 1978), ARCH-LM test for ARCH effects (Engle, 1982) and Jarque-
Bera test for normality (Jarque and Bera, 1980). ܳସ denotes the 4th-order Ljung-Box test, where ܳସ~߯ଶ; ܣସ	denotes the 4th-order ARCH-LM test, where ܣସ~߯ଶ; and ܬܤ denotes the Jarque-Bera statistics, where ܬܤ~߯ଶ. The sample comprises six sets of monthly stock premiums for the period from January 1982 to March 
2011, where ܪܯܮ, ܮܸܲ, ܸܵܲ ܵܯܤ, ܩܵܲ and ܸܵܲ denote the value, large value, small value, size, growth size 
and value size premiums, respectively. Finally, (*; **; ***) denote a coefficient that is significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
Observations   351.0000   351.0000   351.0000   351.0000   351.0000   351.0000 
Mean   0.2690   0.0448   0.4930   0.1736  -0.0779   0.3703 
Median   0.2100  -0.0700   0.2900   0.0500  -0.1400   0.1900 
Standard Deviation   3.6631   3.5441   4.2631   2.9737   3.8441   3.1725 
Skewness  -20.7900  -14.1300  -27.4500  -11.6000  -14.9500  -8.7900 
Excess Kurtosis   3.6631   3.5441   4.2631   2.9737   3.8441   3.1725 
       
Panel B: Results from the Ljung-Box, ARCH-LM and Jarque-Bera Tests 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ܳସ   11.7500**   7.2192   14.6730*   3.9573   5.1817   5.2419 
ܣସ   82.6854*   65.0200*   88.6378*   51.2635*   71.8764*   9.6471* 
ܬܤ   675.5323*   108.3127*  1236.7740*   91.8255*   260.6894*   165.5702* 
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TABLE II: FINANCIAL DISTRESS & STOCK PREMIUMS 
This table presents the results of the GARCH (1,1) model in Expression (1), which examines the relationship 
between financial distress (proxied by the default premium) and stock premiums, where: 
ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߶ଵܦܧܨܣܷܮ ௧ܶ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ                        (1) ݄௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߚ݄௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߥ௧ 
In the mean equation, ߜ measures the impact of past stock premiums on the current stock premium; ߶ଵ measures 
the impact of financial distress (proxied by the default premium); ߟ measures the impact of the January effect on 
stock premiums (where ܵܧܣܱܵܰ is a dummy variable and ܵܧܣܱܵܰ ൌ 1 if the observation falls in January and 
ܵܧܣܱܵܰ ൌ 0 otherwise); and ߨଵ measures the impact of the most recent expansionary period on stock 
premiums (where ܦܷܯܯܻ is a dummy variable and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 1 if the observation falls in the period between 
November 2001 and July 2007 and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 0 otherwise). In the variance equation, ߱ measures the impact 
of the long-run average variance on the volatility at time ݐ; ߙ measures the impact of volatility shock at time 
ݐ െ 1 on the volatility at time ݐ; and ߚ measures the impact of past volatility shocks on the volatility at time ݐ. In 
the robustness checks, ܣସ	denotes the 4th-order ARCH-LM test (Engle, 1982), where ܣସ~߯ଶ; and ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻ ൑1 
measures the persistence of volatility. The sample comprises six sets of monthly stock premiums for the period 
from January 1982 to March 2011, where ܪܯܮ, ܮܸܲ, ܸܵܲ ܵܯܤ, ܩܵܲ and ܸܵܲ denote the value, large value, 
small value, size, growth size and value size premiums, respectively. Finally, (*; **; ***) denote a coefficient 
that is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Mean Equation 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ߤ   0.0429  -0.1727   0.1832  -0.0730  -0.3323***   0.0431 
ߜ   0.1248**   0.0866   0.1874*   0.0217   0.1098***  -0.0396 
߶ଵ   0.3274*   0.3844*   0.2659*   0.4851*   0.5049*   0.6416* 
ߟ   0.3317   0.4936   0.4129   0.7545   1.1270**   0.8709*** 
ߨଵ   0.5869**   0.7741**   0.3748   0.3487   0.5717   0.0894 
       
Panel B: Variance Equation 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
߱   0.8323**   0.5315**   1.1658**   0.5180***   0.6894**   0.4454** 
ߙ   0.3456*   0.2361*   0.3137*   0.1118*   0.1525*   0.1122* 
ߚ   0.6003*   0.7256*   0.6245*   0.8244*   0.7950*   0.8428* 
       
Panel C: Residual Diagnostics 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ܣସ   0.5834   2.0623   2.7804   4.4529   3.6952   3.8622 
ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻ   0.9459   0.9617   0.9382   0.9362   0.9475   0.9549 
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TABLE III: LIQUIDITY CRISES & STOCK PREMIUMS 
This table presents the results of the TARCH (1,1,1) model in Expression (2), which examines the relationship 
between liquidity crises (proxied by the TED spread) and stock premiums, where: 
ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߣ݄௧ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߯ଵܶܧܦ௧ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ                                     (2) 
݄௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛߝ௧ିଵଶ ݀௧ ൅ ߚ݄௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߯ଶܶܧܦ௧൅ߥ௧ 
In the mean equation, ߣ measures whether stock premiums follow time-varying phenomena; ߜ measures the 
impact of past stock premiums on the current stock premium; ߯ଵ measures the impact of financial distress 
(proxied by the TED spread); ߟ measures the impact of the January effect on stock premiums (where ܵܧܣܱܵܰ 
is a dummy variable and ܵܧܣܱܵܰ ൌ 1 if the observation falls in January and ܵܧܣܱܵܰ ൌ 0 otherwise); and ߨଵ 
measures the impact of the most recent expansionary period on stock premiums (where ܦܷܯܯܻ is a dummy 
variable and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 1 if the observation falls in the period between November 2001 and July 2007 and 
ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 0 otherwise). In the variance equation, ߱ measures the impact of the long-run average variance on 
the volatility at time ݐ; ߙ measures the impact of good news on volatility; ߙ ൅ ߛ measures the impact of bad 
news on volatility; ߛ measures the impact of the leverage effect on volatility; ߚ measures the impact of past 
volatility shocks on the volatility at time ݐ; and ߯ଶ measures the impact of liquidity crises (proxied by the TED 
spread) on volatility. In the robustness checks, ܣସ	denotes the 4th-order ARCH-LM test (Engle, 1982), where ܣସ~߯ଶ; and ሺߙ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ 2⁄ ሻ ൑1 measures the persistence of volatility. The sample comprises six sets of monthly 
stock premiums for the period from January 1982 to March 2011, where ܪܯܮ, ܮܸܲ, ܸܵܲ ܵܯܤ, ܩܵܲ and ܸܵܲ 
denote the value, large value, small value, size, growth size and value size premiums, respectively. Finally, (*; 
**; ***) denote a coefficient that is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Mean Equation 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ߤ  -0.9364**  -0.5661  -1.0783***  -1.2648**  -0.6393  -2.0165 
ߣ   0.3538**   0.1189   0.3979***   0.4556**   0.1032   0.6946 
ߜ	   0.1200**   0.0687   0.1523**   0.0114   0.1067***  -0.0079 
߯ଵ   5.2829  -0.5346   4.8918   6.9459   1.7074   3.0580 
ߟ   0.2343   0.3050   0.2827   0.8312***   1.3409*   0.9966 
ߨଵ   0.6558*   0.9995*   0.5138**   0.2390   0.4696   0.1982 
       
Panel B: Variance Equation 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
߱   0.6787**   0.6209*   0.7339***   0.3050***   0.7757**   3.1159** 
ߙ   0.0851***   0.0615   0.1132***   0.0296   0.1468*   0.0780 
ߛ   0.3824*   0.2496*   0.2912*   0.1087***   0.0382   0.0502 
ߚ   0.6776*   0.7645*   0.7122*   0.8849*   0.7794*   0.5941* 
߯ଶ  -11.5704  -71.6411*   3.8844  -36.5900*  -51.9055  -116.8292* 
       
Panel C: Residual Diagnostics 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ܣସ   0.0339   3.0522   3.2526   2.2185   3.9258   2.7549 
ሺߙ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ 2⁄ ሻ   0.9539   0.9507   0.9710   0.9689   0.9453   0.6972 
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TABLE IV: STOCK PREMIUM, DEFAULT RISK & LIQUIDITY CRISIS 
This table presents the results of the TARCH (1,1,1) model in Expression (3), which examines the relationship 
between default risk (proxied by the default premium) liquidity crises (proxied by the TED spread) and stock 
premiums, where: 
ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߣ݄௧ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߶ଵܦܧܨܣܷܮܶ ൅ ߯ଵܶܧܦ௧ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ                        (3) 
݄௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛߝ௧ିଵଶ ݀௧ ൅ ߚ݄௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߶ଶܦܧܨܣܷܮܶ ൅ ߯ଶܶܧܦ௧൅ߥ௧ 
In the mean equation, ߣ measures whether stock premiums follow time-varying phenomena; ߜ measures the 
impact of past stock premiums on the current stock premium; ߶ଵ measures the impact of financial distress 
(proxied by the default premium); ߯ଵ measures the impact of financial distress (proxied by the TED spread); ߟ 
measures the impact of the January effect on stock premiums (where ܵܧܣܱܵܰ is a dummy variable and 
ܵܧܣܱܵܰ ൌ 1 if the observation falls in January and ܵܧܣܱܵܰ ൌ 0 otherwise); and ߨଵ measures the impact of 
the most recent expansionary period on stock premiums (where ܦܷܯܯܻ is a dummy variable and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ
1 if the observation falls in the period between November 2001 and July 2007 and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 0 otherwise). In 
the variance equation, ߱ measures the impact of the long-run average variance on the volatility at time ݐ; ߙ 
measures the impact of good news on volatility; ߙ ൅ ߛ measures the impact of bad news on volatility; ߛ 
measures the impact of the leverage effect on volatility; ߚ measures the impact of past volatility shocks on the 
volatility at time ݐ; ߨଶ measures the impact of the most recent expansionary period on volatility (where ܦܷܯܯܻ is a dummy variable and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 1 if the observation falls in the period between November 2001 
and July 2007 and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 0 otherwise); and ߯ଶ measures the impact of liquidity crises (proxied by the TED 
spread) on volatility. In the robustness checks, ܣସ	denotes the 4th-order ARCH-LM test (Engle, 1982), where ܣସ~߯ଶ; and ሺߙ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ 2⁄ ሻ ൑1 measures the persistence of volatility. The sample comprises six sets of monthly 
stock premiums for the period from January 1982 to March 2011, where ܪܯܮ, ܮܸܲ, ܸܵܲ ܵܯܤ, ܩܵܲ and ܸܵܲ 
denote the value, large value, small value, size, growth size and value size premiums, respectively. Finally, (*; 
**; ***) denote a coefficient that is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Mean Equation 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ߤ  -0.9244**  -0.5385  -0.9974***  -1.0359***  -0.4508  -1.9927* 
ߣ   0.3544**   0.1130   0.3756***   0.3815   0.0503   0.8020* 
ߜ	   0.1184**   0.0652   0.1524**   0.0089   0.1156***  -0.0696 
߶ଵ   0.3366*   0.3231*   0.2472**   0.4982*   0.5192*   0.6292* 
߯ଵ   9.5132   6.5605   5.9403   7.7030   10.4700   6.0344 
ߟ   0.1077   0.2823   0.1740   0.8487***   1.3322*   0.7997 
ߨଵ   0.6466*   0.9299*   0.5339**   0.2928   0.4435   0.0959 
       
Panel B: Variance Equation 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
߱   0.5943**   0.5245*   0.6469   0.3631***   0.5638**   0.2288*** 
ߙ   0.1070**   0.0820   0.1315**   0.0902**   0.1551*   0.0781*** 
ߛ   0.4034*   0.2379**   0.2764**   0.0281   0.0082   0.0033 
ߚ   0.6628*   0.7596*   0.7107*   0.8516*   0.8030*   0.8934* 
߶ଶ  -0.2530  -0.0552  -0.2328  -0.1699  -0.2057  -0.4595*** 
߯ଶ   6.6205  -63.6968*   12.8596  -36.5984**  -78.7022*  -38.0822* 
       
Panel C: Residual Diagnostics 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ܣସ   0.1083   3.0247   3.2759   2.9866   4.0141   3.5910 
ሺߙ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ 2⁄ ሻ   0.9715   0.9606   0.9804   0.9559   0.9622   0.9732 
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TABLE V: LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS 
This table presents the results of likelihood ratio tests and performed to determine which of the nested models 
above performs best. The models tested are as follows: 
ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߶ଵܦܧܨܣܷܮ ௧ܶ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ                        (1) ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߣ݄௧ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߯ଵܶܧܦ௧ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ                        (2) 
݄௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛߝ௧ିଵଶ ݀௧ ൅ ߚ݄௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߯ଶܶܧܦ௧൅ߥ௧ 
ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߣ݄௧ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߶ଵܦܧܨܣܷܮܶ ൅ ߯ଵܶܧܦ௧ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ           (3) 
݄௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛߝ௧ିଵଶ ݀௧ ൅ ߚ݄௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߶ଶܦܧܨܣܷܮܶ ൅ ߯ଶܶܧܦ௧൅ߥ௧ 
ܮ݋݃	ܮ and ܮܴ denote the model’s log-likelihood and the likelihood-ratio test statistic, respectively, where 
ܮܴ~߯ଶ. The sample comprises six sets of monthly stock premiums for the period from January 1982 to March 
2011, where ܪܯܮ, ܮܸܲ, ܸܵܲ ܵܯܤ, ܩܵܲ and ܸܵܲ denote the value, large value, small value, size, growth size 
and value size premiums, respectively. Finally, (*; **; ***) denote a coefficient that is significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Test of Expression (1) vs. Expression (3) 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ܮ݋݃	ܮ for (1) -859.5696 -872.8620 -914.6402 -840.5910 -906.0180 -865.2289 
ܮ݋݃	ܮ for (3) -844.9998 -864.3579 -904.9230 -836.7851 -903.0493 -853.6247 
ܮܴ	  29.1396*  17.0082*  19.4344*   7.6118**   5.9374  23.2084* 
       
Panel B: Test of Expression (2) vs. Expression (3) 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ܮ݋݃	ܮ for (2) -849.4564 -868.4151 -906.4985 -849.0168 -915.6679 -871.1710 
ܮ݋݃	ܮ for (3) -844.9998 -864.3579 -904.9230 -836.7851 -903.0493 -853.6247 
ܮܴ	   8.9132*   8.1144*   3.1510***  24.4634*  25.2372*  35.0926* 
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TABLE A1: FINANCIAL DISTRESS & STOCK PREMIUMS (CREDIT SPREAD) 
This table presents the results of the GARCH (1,1) model in Expression (1), which examines the relationship 
between financial distress (proxied by the credit spread) and stock premiums, where: 
ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߶ଵܦܧܨܣܷܮ ௧ܶ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ                                     (1) ݄௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߚ݄௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߥ௧ 
In the mean equation, ߜ measures the impact of past stock premiums on the current stock premium; ߶ଵ measures 
the impact of financial distress (proxied by the credit spread); ߟ measures the impact of the January effect on 
stock premiums (where ܵܧܣܱܵܰ is a dummy variable and ܵܧܣܱܵܰ ൌ 1 if the observation falls in January and 
ܵܧܣܱܵܰ ൌ 0 otherwise); and ߨଵ measures the impact of the most recent expansionary period on stock 
premiums (where ܦܷܯܯܻ is a dummy variable and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 1 if the observation falls in the period between 
November 2001 and July 2007 and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 0 otherwise). In the variance equation, ߱ measures the impact 
of the long-run average variance on the volatility at time ݐ; ߙ measures the impact of volatility shock at time 
ݐ െ 1 on the volatility at time ݐ; and ߚ measures the impact of past volatility shocks on the volatility at time ݐ. In 
the robustness checks, ܣସ	denotes the 4th-order ARCH-LM test (Engle, 1982), where ܣସ~߯ଶ; and ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻ ൑1 
measures the persistence of volatility. The sample comprises six sets of monthly stock premiums for the period 
from January 1982 to March 2011, where ܪܯܮ, ܮܸܲ, ܸܵܲ ܵܯܤ, ܩܵܲ and ܸܵܲ denote the value, large value, 
small value, size, growth size and value size premiums, respectively. Finally, (*; **; ***) denote a coefficient 
that is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Mean Equation 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ߤ   0.0341  -0.2805  -0.0137  -0.9469*  -0.8693**  -1.2033* 
ߜ   0.1269**   0.0868   0.1898*   0.0161   0.1071***  -0.0374 
߶ଵ   0.0138   0.9470   1.4385   7.2459*   4.3013**   11.0274* 
ߟ   0.4418   0.6015   0.5239   0.8394***   1.3011*   0.9895*** 
ߨଵ   0.6113**   0.7578**   0.3691   0.1082   0.4281  -0.2788 
       
Panel B: Variance Equation 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
߱   0.8313*   0.5661**   1.0790**   0.5366***   0.7511**   0.5073** 
ߙ   0.3463*   0.2309*   0.3223*   0.1083*   0.1513*   0.0919** 
ߚ   0.6072*   0.7286*   0.6311*   0.8287*   0.7945*   0.8558* 
       
Panel C: Residual Diagnostics 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ܣସ   1.1948   2.1930   3.3879   4.3841   3.9389   3.5606 
ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻ   0.9535   0.9595   0.9534   0.9370   0.9459   0.9477 
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TABLE A2: STOCK PREMIUM, DEFAULT RISK & LIQUIDITY CRISIS (CREDIT SPREAD) 
This table presents the results of the TARCH (1,1,1) model in Expression (3), which examines the relationship 
between default risk (proxied by the credit spread) liquidity crises (proxied by the TED spread) and stock 
premiums, where: 
ܸܵܲݏ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߣ݄௧ ൅ ߜܸܵܲݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߶ଵܦܧܨܣܷܮܶ ൅ ߯ଵܶܧܦ௧ ൅ ߟܵܧܣܱܵ ௧ܰ ൅ ߨଵܦܷܯܯ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ݄௧ଶሻ           (3) 
݄௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߛߝ௧ିଵଶ ݀௧ ൅ ߚ݄௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߶ଶܦܧܨܣܷܮܶ ൅ ߯ଶܶܧܦ௧൅ߥ௧ 
In the mean equation, ߣ measures whether stock premiums follow time-varying phenomena; ߜ measures the 
impact of past stock premiums on the current stock premium; ߶ଵ measures the impact of financial distress 
(proxied by the credit spread); ߯ଵ measures the impact of financial distress (proxied by the TED spread); ߟ 
measures the impact of the January effect on stock premiums (where ܵܧܣܱܵܰ is a dummy variable and 
ܵܧܣܱܵܰ ൌ 1 if the observation falls in January and ܵܧܣܱܵܰ ൌ 0 otherwise); and ߨଵ measures the impact of 
the most recent expansionary period on stock premiums (where ܦܷܯܯܻ is a dummy variable and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ
1 if the observation falls in the period between November 2001 and July 2007 and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 0 otherwise). In 
the variance equation, ߱ measures the impact of the long-run average variance on the volatility at time ݐ; ߙ 
measures the impact of good news on volatility; ߙ ൅ ߛ measures the impact of bad news on volatility; ߛ 
measures the impact of the leverage effect on volatility; ߚ measures the impact of past volatility shocks on the 
volatility at time ݐ; ߨଶ measures the impact of the most recent expansionary period on volatility (where ܦܷܯܯܻ is a dummy variable and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 1 if the observation falls in the period between November 2001 
and July 2007 and ܦܷܯܯܻ ൌ 0 otherwise); and ߯ଶ measures the impact of liquidity crises (proxied by the TED 
spread) on volatility. In the robustness checks, ܣସ	denotes the 4th-order ARCH-LM test (Engle, 1982), where ܣସ~߯ଶ; and ሺߙ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ 2⁄ ሻ ൑1 measures the persistence of volatility. The sample comprises six sets of monthly 
stock premiums for the period from January 1982 to March 2011, where ܪܯܮ, ܮܸܲ, ܸܵܲ ܵܯܤ, ܩܵܲ and ܸܵܲ 
denote the value, large value, small value, size, growth size and value size premiums, respectively. Finally, (*; 
**; ***) denote a coefficient that is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Mean Equation 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ߤ  -0.8224***  -0.2004  -1.0765***  -1.8361*  -1.2614***  -2.8966* 
ߣ   0.3684**   0.1180   0.3944***   0.4053***   0.1069   0.7878* 
ߜ	   0.1172**   0.0612   0.1607*   0.0059   0.1031***  -0.0486 
߶ଵ  -1.2592  -3.0522   0.1364   5.7863*   4.7443***   6.9520** 
߯ଵ   4.8266   3.7849   5.7857   9.8367   6.0599   5.0113 
ߟ   0.1835   0.3586   0.3938   0.8902***   1.3281**   0.8265 
ߨଵ   0.7240*   1.0022*   0.4397   0.0157   0.3469  -0.1697 
       
Panel B: Variance Equation 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
߱   0.8596   0.4506   0.4243   0.2861   0.7291   0.2922 
ߙ   0.0743   0.0597   0.1187***   0.0459***   0.1535*   0.0408** 
ߛ   0.3966*   0.2405*   0.2769*   0.1041   0.0469   0.0656*** 
ߚ   0.6835*   0.7733*   0.6977*   0.8683*   0.7646*   0.8920* 
߶ଶ  -1.5090   0.9348   3.5511   0.2922   0.7683   0.2347 
߯ଶ  -13.1764  -67.7087*   8.6058  -30.2355***  -57.0848  -38.3205** 
       
Panel C: Residual Diagnostics 
 ࡴࡹࡸ ࡸࢂࡼ ࡿࢂࡼ ࡿࡹ࡮ ࡳࡿࡼ ࢂࡿࡼ 
ܣସ   0.0874   3.2657   3.8736   3.4312   3.7956   2.4688 
ሺߙ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ 2⁄ ሻ   0.9561   0.9533   0.9548   0.9662   0.9416   0.9657 
       
 
